
Chinese State-Owned Media Coverage of Labor Strikes: A Foxconn Case Study

Max Abramson¹

Emory University

Introduction

Chinese media, specifically state-run news organizations such as the *Global Times*, *Xinhua*, *China Daily*, is frequently accused of being “overly simplistic and potentially dangerous... selling ‘patriotic conspiracy theories’” or “suppressing news... overwhelming it, flooding the market with [their] own information” in their role as the largest media sources in China.² These allegations are supported by the many international organizations charged with ranking countries according to their press freedom and internet restrictions. Freedom House has deemed China’s press “not free” with a nearly identical classification for its internet access rights. Political rights and civil liberties are ranked at 7, meaning least free possible, and 6 respectively, giving China an overall score of 6.5. Unpacking this classification, both media reporting and group activism have

¹ A version of this paper was presented at the 2019 REALC Undergraduate Students Research Symposium and is also published in the 2019 REALC Undergraduate Students Research Symposium Special Edition of the *Emory Journal of Asian Studies*.

² Zheping Huang, and Zheping Huang. "Inside the Global Times, China's Hawkish, Belligerent State Tabloid." Quartz. August 10, 2016. <https://qz.com/745577/inside-the-global-times-chinas-hawkish-belligerent-state-tabloid/>; Isaac Stonefish. "Is China's Xinhua the Future of Journalism?" Newsweek. September 10, 2010. <https://www.newsweek.com/chinas-xinhua-future-journalism-71961>; Andrew Higgins. "Hong Kong Clings to Separate Identity." The Independent. October 08, 2012. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/hong-kong-clings-to-separate-identity-8201862.html>.

“struggled in the midst of a multiyear crackdown” in the fight for human and labor rights in China.³ This view has been echoed by other groups such as Reporters Without Borders’ RSF Index and Knoema’s (a digital statistics firm) China Press Freedom Index.⁴

These depictions of Chinese media raise the question of what the stances of Chinese state-owned media sources should be when reporting on specific issues. Analyzed through the lens of Western media and international organizations, it seems as though one should expect a unified ideological line based on the official Chinese Communist Party (CCP) position. For example, if a news outlet truly was focused on creating a “flood” of information passed down from the government, its tone towards the CCP should be consistent with the official government position and narrative. These concerns at the academic level are based on analyses of Chinese media and how Chinese media still retains much of the original Soviet model of journalism, where the media acts as a “mouthpiece” for the state.⁵ Others still go as far as to say that the Chinese state uses state-owned media sources to “manufacture consensus” through the agenda-setting effects provided coverage of certain issues. However, this notion is controversial as some scholars have argued that the effect is minimal or non-existent.⁶

³ "Freedom in the World 2017: China." Freedom House. March 20, 2017. Accessed April 03, 2019. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/china>.

⁴ "New Report Finds Media Freedom Declined Globally." VOA. April 20, 2016. <https://www.voanews.com/a/reportmedia-freedom-declines-globally/3293474.html>; "China Press Freedom Index, 2002-2018." Knoema. <https://knoema.com/atlas/China/Press-freedom-index>.

⁵ Z. He, "How do the Chinese media reduce organizational incongruence? Bureaucratic capitalism in the name of communism." in *Chinese media, global contexts*, (London: Routledge, 2002), 196–214; Guoguang Wu. "Command Communication: The Politics of Editorial Formulation in the People’s Daily." *The China Quarterly* 137 (1994): 194. doi:10.1017/s0305741000034111.

⁶ H. Fang, *A comprehensive history of Chinese journalism*, Vol. III. (Beijing: Renmin University of China Press, 1996), 81-85.; (cont.)

Contributing to this debate, while some studies have found variation in the presentation of overall coverage by Chinese state-owned media, these studies also found that many of the media outlets regularly arrived at similar ideological conclusions despite large variation in share of voice and tone.⁷

To analyze the level of control of Chinese media-state interactions, a proper indicator is an issue of immense importance. Such an indicator carries significant implications for the both the state narrative and the correctness of information disseminated by state-owned media, while also accounting for sufficiently available data such that a meaningful connection can be established.⁸ More specifically, one of the most contentious and informative issues in terms of Chinese control over the media narrative regards the coverage of labor disputes and strikes. These disputes are viewed not only as a source of public dissatisfaction with the government, but also a threat to corporate reliance on cheap labor that encourages manufacturing investments from abroad. As a result, labor disputes are a valuable indicator of the Chinese media's ability to produce coverage regarding challenging issues given strict government standards.⁹ In this

G. Yu, *Tracking the change: Chinese journalism practice and theory in a transitional era*, (Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press, 1996), 120-137; G. Zhang, "An analysis of the "agenda setting function" of the Chinese media," *The Journalist Monthly* 6 (2001): 3-6.

⁷ Shaun Breslin, and Shen Simon. "Online Chinese Nationalism." WRAP. September 01, 2010. <http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/43592/>; Ying Jiang, *Cyber-nationalism in China: Challenging Western Media Portrayals of Internet Censorship in China*. (Adelaide: Univ. of Adelaide Press, 2012), 31-54.

⁸ Dan Wu, Therese Hesketh, and Xu-Dong Zhou. "Media Contribution to Violence against Health Workers in China: A Content Analysis Study of 124 Online Media Reports." *The Lancet* 386 (2015). doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(15)00662-5; Ying Jiang, "'Reversed Agenda-setting Effects' in China Case Studies of Weibo Trending Topics and the Effects on State-owned Media in China," *Journal of International Communication* 20, no. 2 (2014): 168-83. doi:10.1080/13216597.2014.908785.

⁹ Caldwell Ernst, "Horizontal Rights and Chinese Constitutionalism: Judicialization Through Labor Disputes," *Chicago-Kent Law Review* 88(1) (2013): 63-91; Kan Wang, and Manfred Elfstrom, "Worker Unrest and Institutional Change: Perceptions of Local Trade Union Leaders in China," *China Information* 31, no. 1 (2016): 84-106.

context, no dispute is more high profile and consequential than that of the Foxconn labor struggle (2008-present), which are largely viewed as an indicator of larger labor unrest in China.¹⁰ This case study provides an illuminating analysis regarding CCP influence over media in the context of labor and provides a much clearer statistical picture than a data set that might include a number of confounding variables.¹¹ Furthermore, the struggle surrounding Foxconn is a significant Chinese labor dispute, and reveals information regarding the tone with which actors are recognized and the share of voice they receive by Chinese state media in similar contexts.

Hypothesis 1: Chinese state-owned media will maintain homogeneous coverage in both tone and share of voice in coverage of the Foxconn labor disputes.

Hypothesis 2: Chinese state-owned media will maintain a positive tone for reporting on the Chinese government and corporations.

doi:10.1177/0920203x16682491; Fang Cai, and Meiyang Wang. *Labour Market Changes, Labour Disputes and Social Cohesion in China*. (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012), 78-95.

¹⁰ Jan Larsen, "Recent Labor Unrest in China," *Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research* 17 (1) (2011): 91-93; Qijin Cheng, Feng Chen, and Paul Sf Yip. "The Foxconn Suicides and Their Media Prominence: Is the Werther Effect Applicable in China?," *BMC Public Health* 11, no. 1 (2011). doi:10.1186/1471-2458-11-841; Michael Bush, "Foxconn Crisis Proves Need for Global PR," *Advertising Age* 81(40) (2010): 6; Sarah Waters, "Workplace Suicide and States of Denial: The France Telecom and Foxconn Cases Compared," *TripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society* 15, no. 1 (2017): 191-213. doi:10.31269/triplec.v15i1.801; Jenny Chan, "Dying for an iPhone: The Labour Struggle of China's New Working Class," *TripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society* 12, no. 2 (2014). doi:10.31269/triplec.v12i2.637.

¹¹ Feagin, J., Orum, A., & Sjoberg, G. *A case for case study*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 115-150.

Hypothesis 3: Chinese state-owned media will cover workers with a negative tone.

Hypothesis 4: Chinese state-owned media will grant a larger share of voice to the Chinese government and corporations than to the workers.

Hypothesis 5: Chinese state-owned media will give workers a low share of voice.

Hypothesis 6: Length and date of publication for articles by state-owned media will have no substantial correlation with tone or share of voice in those articles.

Data and Method

The study seeks to determine with what tone does Chinese state-owned media address actors in labor disputes. I use Dunaway's (2013) approach regarding *content analysis of visibility and tone from approach* to code variables in order to produce relevant data. Included in the data set were date published, outlet, length of article, tone towards actors, visibility of the actors, and headline.¹² Actors are defined as the CCP, Foxconn, and workers/labor activists. A significant difference from Dunaway in terms of scope of analysis is that this study does not seek or claim to derive the determinants of these tones from particular media characteristics. Rather, the results are meant to aid in the determination of tonal preferences from state-owned media when covering labor disputes and their relative proximity to what might be considered the 'party line.' This method tests the assumption that Chinese media should remain favorable in reporting towards the CCP and CCP-favored groups, while negatively reporting on other actors adversarial to the CCP narrative. More specifically, this

¹² Johanna Dunaway, "Media Ownership and Story Tone in Campaign News," *American Politics Research* 41(1) (2013): 24-53.

involves testing the differences between the various outlets as they report, along with testing their similarity in terms of tone and share of voice.

To this end, a content analysis of state-owned media coverage of Foxconn labor disputes will be used as a method to determine what tone is used, the variation between state-owned media sources, and their favorability towards certain actors. This analysis seeks to code the tone of three state-owned media sources, *The Global Times*, *Xinhua*, and *China Daily* in their coverage of Foxconn labor disputes between 2008-2018. These state-owned media sources are the three largest state-owned outlets in China, and 3 of the top 10 media sources in the country.¹³ This analysis involves a test of the similarity of the results between the various outlets, coded as 1, 2 or 3 (for *The Global Times*, *Xinhua* and *China Daily* respectively). The outcome holds relevant information regarding the state-owned media (who should be the most vulnerable to state pressure and censorship) and their responses to labor disputes, acting as an indicator of the likely response of Chinese media to other labor and human rights issues. Furthermore, this functions as a test of the veracity of analyses conducted by Freedom House, Reporters Without Borders, Kneoma, and others regarding the ideological homogeneity and subservience of state-owned media to the CCP.

Sample Information

Sampling was done through *Factiva*, searching for “Foxconn” news stories of any kind from the aforementioned media outlets. Of the results, those which were not directly related to labor disputes, such as articles about new products, were filtered out. The remaining articles were sufficient in sample size to analyze all remaining articles (see Appendix A; Figures 1 and 2; Appendix C, Figure 1; Appendix D, Figure 1; Appendix F, Figure 1).

¹³ "China Profile - Media." BBC News. March 06, 2018.
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13017881>.

Dependent Variable

Content analysis of reporting on Foxconn labor disputes by the three state-owned media sources was used to test the hypotheses. The most important constants between the three sources are their ownership by the state and their coverage of only the Foxconn labor disputes between 2008-2018. The dependent variable is the homogeneity between their coverage in terms of tone and share of voice among the three actors. In all three cases, the company itself is either owned entirely by the CCP (*Xinhua*) or is an official publication of the CCP (*China Daily* and *The Global Times*) (BBC 2018). Online English-version publications of articles regarding the labor disputes by *The Global Times*, *Xinhua*, *China Daily* were content analyzed and coded for tone in coverage and by the visibility of government actors, companies, and workers/activists (the dependent variables analyzed). The coverage analyzed spans from January 2008 to December 2018. To compile this data, the database *Factiva* was used to identify news regarding Foxconn's labor disputes. The coding scheme used a system of tone analysis which ascribed values of 0 for no overall tone, 1 for negative tone, 2 for balanced tone, and 3 for positive tone. The same scheme was applied to visibility through share of voice which was marked as 0 for no reference, 1 for minor share of voice, 2 for moderate share of voice, and 3 for large share of the voice in the article.

Independent Variable

The independent variable is the outlet of publication. While this may seem to be a minor categorical distinction, it is important to note the significant homogeneity among the three sources. As such, difference, or the lack of difference, between the various outlets described above serve as important indicators of the Chinese media control structure as well as government connection to these outlets. As this is a comparison of three populations (both for the tone and the share of voice), a one-way ANOVA test is utilized to determine if the null hypothesis of their mean tone and share of voice are the same. This will demonstrate if at least one of the media sources is different, which would evidence that there is some variation in

the ways in which state-owned media report on labor disputes. This test was followed by a paired means t-Test to determine which pairs of means are different and to determine what state-owned outlet produces different results from the rest of the group. The results were controlled for variation in length of article so as to not give longer articles a greater ability to allow expansive share of voice or tone simply by nature of being longer.

The search term within Factiva was “Foxconn[,]” from January 2008 to December 2018. Restrictions on the search was that it had to be related to Foxconn (meaning excluding all other articles through Factiva’s filtering parameters). The articles had to be published between January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2018. Articles not pertaining to labor disputes or working conditions (including worker suicides) were removed from consideration. In the case of the *Global Times*, these parameters led to a reduction of the 86 results found to only 19, which were then coded (n=19). *Xinhua* produced only 52 results, which were then reduced to the much smaller sample size of 8 before coding (n=8). For *China Daily*, the reduction was from 241 (including duplicates filtered out by Factiva) to 28 and then coded (n=28). In total, the number of articles coded was 55. There is a discrepancy in terms of the sample size in each group, which might make analysis of the largest media corporation, *China Daily*, much more representative than the smallest, *Xinhua*. No other restrictions were put in place with regards to author, company, subject, industry or region.

Findings

As expected, the ANOVA test revealed that the null hypothesis ($H_0: \mu_1 = \mu_2 = \mu_3$) failed to be rejected in that it demonstrated that $F < F_{critical}$ was critical in all tone and share of voice determinations for all actors. As such, there is strong evidence for Hypothesis 1 relating to their similarity in coverage. However, unexpectedly, they were consistent, but only in the opposite direction of the original Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5. The original hypotheses posited that state-owned media would be similar in terms of their positive coverage of the state and companies, with negative coverage for the workers according to the same degree of coverage regarding share of voice. Instead,

the results indicated that state-owned media maintains a consistently negative view and a low share of voice for the government with a high share of voice for the company and workers. This indicates a substantial departure from the original assumptions of the introduction.

Tone

Opening with tone, specifically with the results from Outlet 1 (*The Global Times*), the results seem incompatible with the hypotheses stated earlier. The distribution of tone towards the government (see Appendix A; Figure 1) falls on either a null value or negative in most cases ($\mu T_{\text{govt}} = 0.94736842105$). The average tone for the government coverage was either negative or the government was not mentioned at all. This conflicts with Hypothesis 2 which posits that the *Global Times* would maintain a positive tone towards the CCP on average. The fact that the *Global Times* fails to meet this hypothesis calls into question the accusations of its role as a “mouthpiece” for the state given that many of the articles published in this context reflect badly upon the government. Furthermore, the tone towards the company (see Appendix A; Figure 2) also provides evidence against Hypothesis 2, which argued that the media would maintain a positive tone towards Foxconn. As stated previously, the party tends to take the side of corporations, previously going so far as to prevent reporting on industrial disasters in the name of protecting foreign investment. Yet in the reporting by *The Global Times*, most of the articles published had a negative tone, with the entirety of the remainder being neutral ($\mu T_{\text{company}} = 1.26315789474$). This μ demonstrates that the average tone was negative with a slight move towards neutral. The final actor, the workers, also provides evidence for the opposite of what Hypothesis 4 would suggest relating to an expectation of negative coverage of workers and labor activists (see Appendix A; Figure 3). *The Global Times* treated the workers with the best average tone of all. Most stories were in a positive light, and the remainder tended to be neutral. Only a small few were negative ($\mu T_{\text{worker}} = 2.26315789474$). The μ for T_{worker} demonstrates that the average tone was neutral with a slight tendency towards positive coverage. Both Outlet 2 (*China Daily*) and Outlet 3 (*Xinhua*) support similar results

relative to the evidence against the hypotheses presented earlier. The One-Way ANOVA test on the tone demonstrates that their results were similar within a standard deviation with the results from coding Outlet 1.

Share of Voice

With regards to share of voice, the results are extremely similar in terms of their evidence against the relevant hypotheses (4 and 5), as it demonstrates that the distribution of share of voice for the Chinese government in all three outlets is extremely low relative to the other actors involved in the dispute. Moreover, the workers had the highest degree of share of voice overall, and many articles directly quoted them. Despite the low share of voice for the government, the high share of voice for the company does support that portion of the hypothesis. While not nearly as high as that of the workers, the companies were mentioned in every article to some degree, with a large number of the articles using a statement by the company in their titles. At the same time, this might be the result of bias given the search terms which, by virtue of using the name of the company “Foxconn” as the query, guaranteed at least their mention in the article and likely. Regardless, these results lead to a rejection of the original hypotheses on the grounds of the evidence stating that the Chinese government on average, across all outlets, received less coverage than either the corporation or workers.

Furthermore, there seems to be no preference between the various state-owned media outlets as to share of voice, with the results staying fairly uniform and well within the requirements for an ANOVA test of similarity (see Appendix A; Figure 3). This provides evidence of Hypothesis 1, which posited that the state-owned media would maintain a similar amount of share of voice in their coverage. As stated previously, the ANOVA tests demonstrate a remarkable degree of similarity, albeit with the opposite similarities than those predicted by the other hypotheses.

Connection Between Word Count and Tone/Share of Voice

Referencing the final hypothesis, substantial correlation between the word count and the tone or share of voice of articles was a relevant question as longer articles might have more space to reference all of the relevant actors in a dispute. However, as can be seen in Appendix A; Figure 7, the R^2 data demonstrates that such a model on a least sum squared line is not predictive of the variation between the articles for Outlet 1 (*Global Times*). As a result, length of article is not a relevant indicator of either share of voice or tone, which supports hypothesis 6. Similarly, the date of publication resulted in similar outcomes, with the R^2 demonstrating that the model produced from a least sum squared line did not predict variation between the articles. This lack of predictive capacity in trend lines for tone is mirrored by Outlet 3 (*China Daily*), the R^2 for Tgvt (0.112), Tcompany (0.092) and Tworkers (0.001). Share of voice also has low predictive value in trend lines, with R^2 of 0.109 for SVgvt, 0.091 for SVcompany, and 0.002 for SVworkers. As such, it seems that there is no significant correlation between length and tone or share of voice for Outlet 1 and 3.

However, moving to Outlet 2 (*Xinhua*), a few results show a much more predictive R^2 , making it possible to ascribe them some attention and significance. Looking at the R^2 for Tgvt (0.527), there is a strong explanation of the variance of the model, meaning that there is a significant connection between the date published and Tgvt. This means that there was a shift in coverage of government, as Tgvt increased upwards. At the same time, there was a much smaller R^2 for Tcompany (0.002) and Tworkers (0.014) However, this effect was even more pronounced in the share of voice, in which the R^2 for SVgov was 0.658, meaning that it explains a large amount of the variance among the data, which indicates a substantial change in share of voice for the government in their articles over time, trending upward (see Appendix E; 3). The results are smaller for SVcompany ($R^2 = 0.175$) and SVworkers ($R^2 = 0.384$). While the R^2 value for SVworkers is relatively small (indicating a lower degree of predicted variance), its level of predictive value still makes it a relevant, if less valuable, indicator. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that there is a change over time in

SVworkers, although minor. Based on these results, Hypothesis 6 for Outlets 1 and 3 fails to be rejected, as the trend lines do not meet a significant level of prediction of variation in order to make it valuable indicator of change for those outlets. However, there is enough evidence to reject the Hypothesis for Outlet 2 in the context of the Tgvt and SVgov results as well as arguably the SVworkers. As such, this outcome indicates that the date of the article's publication is a significant variable in the determination of coverage of the government and share of voice for the workers. I will analyze this effect below.

Date of Publication

Analyzing each outlet, the results of testing if date had any correlation with tone or share of voice varied widely in statistical significance. With Outlet 1 (*Global Times*), the R^2 for Tgvt, Tcompany, and Tworkers are all incredibly small, meaning that in that case, the model to predict variance between the data points is not significant. With such small values, it seems that the coverage in terms of tone did not evolve over time for Outlet 1. This also holds true when looking at the R^2 for the connection between date published and share of voice, and as a result, one can determine that both the tone and the share of voice for Outlet 1 are related in a statistically insignificant way. In terms of tone, there is little predictive value in the Tgvt (0.001) and Tworkers (0.095) R^2 . Meanwhile, the results for Tcompany are somewhat small in terms of their predictive ability (0.333, meaning it predicts a third of variance. For Outlet 2, the tone demonstrated little connection to the date published Tgvt (0.049) and Tcompany (0.105) had very small R^2 . While Tworkers was relatively larger, it was not substantial enough to warrant indicating a connection (0.0245). The largest R^2 for Outlet 2 was the R^2 for SVcompany (0.333) which is still small, but significant enough to warrant mention. However, none of these values indicate that there is any significant connection between the date published and the tone or share of voice in Outlet 2. Regarding Outlet 3, the date published seems to have little connection to tone, as all of the constituent variables had low R^2 . Tgvt had an R^2 of 0.112, Tcompany had an R^2 of 0.092 and Tworkers had an R^2 of 0.001. None of these indicate any form of

substantial connection between the tone and the date published, mirroring both Outlet 1 and 2, indicating that there is little predictive power in a model for tone by date. The share of voice R^2 were not any more predictive, with SVgov, SVworkers, and SV company all having very low predictive value. As a result, it is reasonable to state that Outlet 3 has little connection between date and the dependent variables.

Based on the repeatedly low R^2 in the regression lines for the date relative to tone and share of voice, Hypothesis 6 fails to be rejected based on that there seems to be little substantial connection between the two. As such, it can largely be eliminated as a potential source of bias in the analysis, although future analysis might still want to control for it given the small, but present connection seen in the Tcompany for Outlet 1 and SVcompany connection for Outlet 2.

Error and Limitations

In terms of potential sources of error, this study was confined to the English language editions of Chinese state-owned news media given my lack of familiarity with the Chinese language. Editions in Chinese and English may reflect different results. There is also a chance of error regarding nuances lost in translation, which is a potential site of future research. Furthermore, the small sample size of <15 for Outlet 2 (*Xinhua*) may cause the results to be misleading with non-normal distributions. These potential errors are even more significant given the lack of intercoder reliability due to a lack of resources to produce coders and create significant results. Future research might attempt to verify the conclusions of this study utilizing intercoder testing. This lack of intercoder reliability is potentially very problematic as Neuendorf (2002) notes, "given that a goal of content analysis is to identify and record relatively objective (or at least intersubjective) characteristics of messages, reliability is paramount.

Without the establishment of reliability, content analysis measures are useless."¹⁴

Conclusion

The findings of this study not only diverged from the hypothesis stated in the introduction, but they indicate that nearly the exact opposite conclusions should be drawn. As seen in the figures of tone for the distribution of Tgovt, Tcompany, and Tworker across all of the state-owned media sources, the government and companies alike tended to be portrayed in a negative light, despite state control. This directly calls into question the argument prevalent in both journalism and intellectual discussion which argues that the state-owned media is nothing more than a platform for the official CCP narrative. As a result, my conclusion diverges from much of the literature on the subject, which still largely regards the role of Chinese state-owned media as an attempt to set the government agenda by the CCP.

An additional important distinction is that research regarding Chinese state-owned media does not often focus on labor issues, but on topics which might be more prominent for everyday citizens such as the presidential term limits, the environment, or regional tensions. While these issues might also provide excellent data from which conclusions could be drawn, there is a significant variable introduced when the topic has high visibility on both the international sphere and in public discourse. This is not to argue that there was little international discussion regarding the Foxconn labor disputes, but rather that other studies might be further confounded by international visibility. Proven by the relatively small number of articles over a 10-year period, it seems logical to conclude that the Foxconn labor dispute is less visible than other issues, such as issues regarding foreign policy. Overall, there is great opportunity for research beyond simply labor.

¹⁴ K. A. Neuendorf, *The Content Analysis Guidebook*, (Thousand Oaks (California): Sage, 2002), 141.

Bibliography

- Huang, Zheping, and Zheping Huang. "Inside the Global Times, China's Hawkish, Belligerent State Tabloid." Quartz. August 10, 2016. <https://qz.com/745577/inside-the-global-times-chinas-hawkish-belligerent-state-tabloid/>.
- Fish, Isaac Stone. "Is China's Xinhua the Future of Journalism?" Newsweek. September 10, 2010. <https://www.newsweek.com/chinas-xinhua-future-journalism-71961>.
- Higgins, Andrew. "Hong Kong Clings to Separate Identity." The Independent. October 08, 2012. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/hong-kong-clings-to-separate-identity-8201862.html>.
- "Freedom in the World 2017: China." Freedom House. March 20, 2017. Accessed April 03, 2019. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/china>.
- "New Report Finds Media Freedom Declined Globally." VOA. April 20, 2016. Accessed April 03, 2019. <https://www.voanews.com/a/reportmedia-freedom-declines-globally/3293474.html>.
- "China Press Freedom Index, 2002-2018." Knoema. Accessed April 03, 2019. <https://knoema.com/atlas/China/Press-freedom-index>.
- He, Z. "How do the Chinese media reduce organizational incongruence? Bureaucratic capitalism in the name of communism." in *Chinese media, global contexts*, London: Routledge, 2002, 196–214.
- Wu, Guoguang. "Command Communication: The Politics of Editorial Formulation in the People's Daily." *The China Quarterly* 137 (1994): 194. doi:10.1017/s0305741000034111.
- Li, L. "On agenda-setting in the manufacturing of mainstream public opinion." Zhuku. March 21, 2009. <http://zhiku.xinwenren.com/2009/0321/2334.html>.
- Fang, H. *A comprehensive history of Chinese journalism*, Vol. III. Beijing: Renmin University of China Press, 1996.

- Yu, G. *Tracking the change: Chinese journalism practice and theory in a transitional era*. Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press, 1996.
- Zhang, G. "An analysis of the "agenda setting function" of the Chinese media." *The Journalist Monthly* 6 (2001): 3–6
- Breslin, Shaun, and Shen Simon. "Online Chinese Nationalism." WRAP. September 01, 2010. <http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/43592/>.
- Jiang, Ying. *Cyber-nationalism in China: Challenging Western Media Portrayals of Internet Censorship in China*. Adelaide: Univ. of Adelaide Press, 2012.
- Wu, Dan, Therese Hesketh, and Xu-Dong Zhou. "Media Contribution to Violence against Health Workers in China: A Content Analysis Study of 124 Online Media Reports." *The Lancet* 386 (2015). doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(15)00662-5.
- Jiang, Ying. "'Reversed Agenda-setting Effects' in China Case Studies of Weibo Trending Topics and the Effects on State-owned Media in China." *Journal of International Communication* 20, no. 2 (2014): 168-83. doi:10.1080/13216597.2014.908785.
- Larsen, Jan. "Recent Labor Unrest in China." *Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research* 17 (1) (2011): 91-93.
- Ernst, Caldwell. "Horizontal Rights and Chinese Constitutionalism: Judicialization Through Labor Disputes." *Chicago-Kent Law Review* 88(1) (2013): 63-91.
- Cai, Fang, and Meiyang Wang. *Labour Market Changes, Labour Disputes and Social Cohesion in China*. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012.
- Wang, Kan, and Manfred Elfstrom. "Worker Unrest and Institutional Change: Perceptions of Local Trade Union Leaders in China." *China Information* 31, no. 1 (2016): 84-106. doi:10.1177/0920203x16682491.
- Cheng, Qijin, Feng Chen, and Paul Yip. "The Foxconn Suicides and Their Media Prominence: Is the Werther Effect Applicable in China?" *BMC Public Health* 11, no. 1 (2011). doi:10.1186/1471-2458-11-841.

- Bush, Michael. "Foxconn Crisis Proves Need for Global PR." *Advertising Age* 81(40) (2010): 6.
- Waters, Sarah. "Workplace Suicide and States of Denial: The France Telecom and Foxconn Cases Compared." *TripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society* 15, no. 1 (2017): 191-213.
doi:10.31269/triplec.v15i1.801.
- Chan, Jenny. "Dying for an iPhone: The Labour Struggle of China's New Working Class." *TripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society* 12, no. 2 (2014). doi:10.31269/triplec.v12i2.637.
- Feagin, J., Orum, A., & Sjoberg, G. *A case for case study*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991.
- Dunaway, Johanna. "Media Ownership and Story Tone in Campaign News." *American Politics Research* 41(1) (2013): 24-53.
- Neuendorf, K. A. *The Content Analysis Guidebook*. Thousand Oaks (California): Sage, 2002.
- "China Profile - Media." BBC News. March 06, 2018.
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13017881>.

APPENDIX A. OVERVIEW OF SOURCES UTILIZED.

Figure 1. Bar Chart of the Number of Articles Which Mentioned “Foxconn.”




Figure 1. Bar Chart of Number of Articles Coded.





Figure 3. Comparison Between Tone and Share of Voice Between Outlets 1-3.



APPENDIX B: TONE IN OUTLET 1 (*THE GLOBAL TIMES*) 2008-2018.

Figure 1. Histogram of Tgvt Distribution for Outlet 1 (*Global Times*).




Figure 2. Histogram of Tcompany Distribution for Outlet 1 (*Global Times*).





Figure 3. Histogram of Tworkers Distribution for Outlet 1 (*Global Times*).



APPENDIX C: SHARE OF VOICE IN OUTLET 1 (*THE GLOBAL TIMES*) 2008-2018.

Figure 1. Frequency of Mention of “Foxconn” 2008-2018.




Figure 2. Histogram of SVgvt Distribution for Outlet 1 (*Global Times*).




Figure 3. Histogram of SVcompany Distribution for Outlet 1 (*Global Times*).





Figure 4. Histogram of SVworker Distribution for Outlet 1 (*Global Times*).



APPENDIX D: TONE IN OUTLET 2 (XINHUA) 2008-2018.

Figure 1. Date and Distribution of Coverage.




Figure 2. Histogram of Tgvt Distribution in Outlet 2 (Xinhua).




Figure 3. Histogram of Tcompany Distribution in Outlet 2 (Xinhua).





Figure 4. Histogram of Tworkers Distribution in Outlet 2 (Xinhua).



APPENDIX E. SHARE OF VOICE IN OUTLET 2 (XINHUA) 2008-2018.

Figure 1. Histogram of SVgov Distribution in Outlet 2 (Xinhua).




Figure 2. Histogram of SVcompany Distribution in Outlet 2 (Xinhua).





Figure 3. Histogram of SVworkers Distribution in Outlet 2 (Xinhua).



APPENDIX F: TONE IN OUTLET 3 (CHINA DAILY) 2008-2018.

Figure 1. Date and Distribution of Coverage.




Figure 2. Histogram of Tgvt Distribution in Outlet 3 (China Daily).




Figure 3. Histogram of Tcompany Distribution in Outlet 3 (*China Daily*).





Figure 4. Histogram of Twokers Distribution in Outlet 3 (*China Daily*).



APPENDIX G. SHARE OF VOICE IN OUTLET 3 (*CHINA DAILY*)

2008-2018.

Figure 1. Histogram of SVgov Distribution in Outlet 3 (*China Daily*).




Figure 2. Histogram of SVcompany Distribution in Outlet 3 (*China Daily*).




Figure 3. Histogram of SVworkers Distribution in Outlet 3 (*China Daily*).

